Raymond P. L. Cannefax and Debra Cannefax v. Donald W. Clement and Ruth L. Clement : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Raymond P. L. Cannefax and Debra Cannefax v.
Donald W. Clement and Ruth L. Clement : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rodney M. Pipella; Attorney for Appellants.
Steven H. Lybbert; Nygaard, Coke, and Vincent; Attorneys for Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cannefax v. Clement, No. 880125.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2044
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS X? 
BRIEF ;v 
UTAH Y ' • .:;•: 
D O C U M E N T :•:' 
K F U V 
50 V 
DOCKET NO.. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND P. L. CANNEFAX and ] 
DEBRA CANNEFAX, ] 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ! 
vs. ] 
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH ] 
L. CLEMENT, ] 
Defendants-Respondents. ] 
1 Case No. 88-0125 
) Category 14.B. 
RESPONDENTS• BRIEF 
Appeal from Order and Summary Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Steven H. Lybbert 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorneys for Respondents 
RODNEY M. PIPELLA 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellants 
HJLS" 198? 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND P. L. CANNEFAX and 
DEBRA CANNEFAX, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants/ 
vs. 
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH 
L. CLEMENT, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 88-0125 
Category 14.B. 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
Appeal from Order and Summary Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Steven H. Lybbert 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorneys for Respondents 
RODNEY M. PIPELLA 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellants 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
All parties to the proceeding are listed in the caption 
on the cover page of this brief. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . 2 
DETERMINITIVE STATUTE • 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
A. THE INTEREST OF A VENDOR OF LANDS CONTRACTED TO 
BE SOLD IS BOUND BY THE LIEN OF A JUDGMENT 
RECOVERED AGAINST HIM WHILE THE CONTRACT IS 
UNEXECUTED, TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS 
UNEXECUTED 7 
B. THE CASES CITED BY APPELLANTS WHICH DISCUSS THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION DO NOT SUPPORT 
THE PROPOSITION THAT THE DOCTRINE MUST BE 
APPLIED IN ALL CASES OR IN THIS CASE IN 
PARTICULAR 14 
C. LACH V. DESERET BANK WAS ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED AND 
SHOULD BE OVERRULED 16 
1. The Lach Discussion of Equitable Conversion 
is Dicta 16 
2. Lach Conflicts With Butler v. Wilkinson . . 17 
3. The Cases Cited in the Lach Discussion of 
Equitable Conversion Do Not Compel the 
Conclusion Reached by the Court of Appeals . 17 
D. THERE IS NO INEQUITY IN A RULE PERMITTING A 
JUDGMENT LIEN TO ATTACH TO THE REMAINING 
INTEREST OF A JUDGMENT DEBTOR-CONTRACT VENDOR . 18 
CONCLUSION 23 
ADDENDUM 24 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 
2. STIPULATED FACTS 
•3. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS [ON DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
4. ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Allred v. Allred/ 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P. 2d 791 
(1964) . . . . 15- 18, 22 
Belnap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978) 17-18 
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962) . . 18, 21 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987) . . 7, 8, 16, 17 
First Security Bank v. Rogers, 429 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1967) . . . 8 
Gray v. Stevens, 5 Utah 2d 361, 302 P.2d 273 (1956) . . . . 20 
Heath v. Dodson, 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941) 10 
Heider v. Dietz, 380 P.2d 619 (Or. 1963) 10 
In re Estate of Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 
(1972) 14, 18 
Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial District Court, 
29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973) . 14, 18 
Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 
(Utah App. 1987) . 14, 16, 17 
Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 595 P.2d 1199 (N.M. 1979) . . . . 15 
May v. Emerson, 96 P. 454 (Or. 1908) 10 
Monroe v. Lincoln City Emp. Credit Union, 279 N.W.2d 866 
(Neb. 1979) 11 
Mooring v. Brown, 763 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1985) 12 
Security State Bank v. Luebke, 737 P.2d 586 (Or. 1987) . . . 22 
Uffenheimer v. Rob Con Enterprises, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 856 
(1980) 13 
STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 2, 6, 8 
Rule 3(a), Rules of the Supreme Court 1 
M 
46 Am Jur 2d Judgments 
Pound, The Progress of 
831 (19201 . . . . . 
SCELLANEOUS CITATIONS 
§266 
the Law 1918-1919, 33 Harv.L.Rev. 813, 
9 
i 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) and Rule 3(a), Rules of 
the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs Raymond and Debra Cannefax are 
appealing from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants 
Donald and Ruth Clement on March 4, 1988. (R. 184-186) The 
Order and Summary Judgment entered by the trial court resulted in 
judgment in the Clement's favor on plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 2-9) 
and on their Counterclaim (R. 32-36). 
The Cannefax1s brought this action seeking to quiet 
their title to property on Lockhart Road in Salt Lake County and 
to restrain the Salt Lake County Sheriff from executing upon the 
property to satisfy a judgment in favor of the Clements and 
against George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila M. Barker. The Clements 
counterclaimed seeking a declaration by the trial court that 
their judgment against the Barkers created a lien against the 
Lockhart Road property. 
The parties stipulated in writing to the facts and 
defendants moved for summary judgment. The motion was heard and 
granted on February 29, 1988. An Order and Summary Judgment was 
entered on March 4, 1988. (R. 184-186) Plaintiffs Cannefax 
appealed from that Order and Summary Judgment in a timely manner. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents Donald and Ruth Clement believe 
the sole issue on appeal should be stated as follows: 
Does a judgment lien attach to property owned by a 
judgment debtor/ but sold by the judgment debtor under a contract 
of sale prior to docketing of the judgment/ when there is still a 
balance owing to the judgment debtor under the contract of sale? 
Stated otherwise/ the issue is whether a contract 
vendor of real property retains an interest in the real property 
to which the lien of a judgment against him can attach/ when the 
l 
contract is still executory. 
DETERMINITIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-22-1 -
I 
"From the time the judgment of the district court or 
circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of 
the district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the 
( 
real property of the judgment debtor/ not exempt from execution/ 
in the county in which the judgment is entered/ owned by him at 
the time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of 
1 1 
said lien . . .." 
1. A photocopy of the entire statute is included in the 
Addendum to this Respondents1 Brief. i 
2 < 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A- STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts are undisputed and the parties filed 
2 
a pleading entitled Stipulated Facts with the trial court-
On August 28/ 1981/ George and Lila Barker were fee 
simple owners of residential property on Lockhart Road in Salt 
Lake County, Utah ("the Lockhart Road property") (R. 105)- On 
that date/ the Barkers entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract with Diane Hodge for sale of the Lockhart Road property 
for the sum of $160/000/ payable $40/000 down and balance over a 
period of time with interest (R„- 106) * 
At the time of the contract sale of the property from 
the Barkers to Diane Hodge/ there existed prior mortgage loan 
obligations against the property in favor of Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association ("Prudential") and Continental Bank 
and Trust Company ("Continental") (R. 106)-
On August 31/ 1981/ Ms- Hodge caused a Notice of 
Contract to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder (R. 
106) . 
Four years later.' on August 15. 1985/ respondents 
Donald and Ruth Clement obtained a judgment in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of Uintah County against the Barkers in 
2. The original pleading entitled Stipulated Facts does not 
appear to be in the court file. However/ a copy signed by 
counsel for appellants is at R. 105-108. The same copy is found 
in the Addendum to the Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants/ and a copy 
signed by counsel for each side is included in the Addendum to 
this brief. 
3 
the amount of $70,526.00 (R. 106). The judgment was docketed 
with the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake j 
County on August 19, 1985 (R. 106). The Clementfs judgment 
against the Barkers was not appealed (R. 106). 
On September 25, 1985, the Barkers still held legal ' 
title to the Lockhart Road property, subject to Diane Hodge's 
interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 106-107). As 
of September 25, 1985, Ms. Hodge owed the Barkers $87,747.40 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and the prior obligations 
to Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50 (R. 107). 
At a real estate closing on September 25, 1985, Diane 
Hodge paid the Barkers $45,000, and the Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a 
credit of $9,464.94 (R. 107). The mortgage loan balances in 
I 
favor of Prudential and Continental were paid off, and the 
Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a warranty deed to the Lockhart Road 
property (R. 107-108). 
At the same closing, Diane Hodge gave a warranty deed 
to the property to appellants Raymond and Debra Cannefax (R. 
107) . 
i 
Both warranty deeds—first the one from the Barkers to 
Hodge, and then the one from Hodge to the Cannefax's—were 
recorded on September 26, 1985 (R. 107). Between closing on 
September 25, 1985, and recording on September 26, 1985, Surety 
Title Agency conducted a title search which disclosed the 
Clement's judgment against the Barkers (R. 108). 
i 
4 < 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
When the Clements learned that the Barkers had owned 
property in Salt Lake County at the time their judgment against 
the Barkers was docketed in Salt Lake County/ they obtained a 
Writ of Execution and caused the Salt Lake County Sheriff to 
serve it. In response, the Cannefax's brought the instant action 
against the Clements to quiet title to the Lockhart Road property 
against the judgment lien claimed by the Clements and to restrain 
the Sheriff from executing upon the judgment lien- The Clements 
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that their judgment 
lien attached to the property and. was superior to the Cannefaxs1 
interest in the property. 
The parties stipulated to the facts set forth above and 
the Clements moved for summary judgment. The summary judgment 
motion was argued and granted. The Honorable Pat B. Brian ruled 
that when the judgment was docketed in Salt Lake County, it 
created a lien on the Lockhart Road property to the extent of the 
amount unpaid on the Uniform Real Estate Contract betwen the 
Barkers and Diane Hodge as of September 25, 1985 (the date Hodge 
received a warranty deed from the Barkers and gave a warranty 
deed to the Cannefaxes), less the amount of the prior 
encumbrances in favor of Prudential and Continental: to wit, the 
judgment lien bound the Lockhart road property in the sum of 
$54,464.94 (R. 184-186). The Cannefaxes appealed from the 
summary judgment granted the Clements. 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The general rule, which should be recognized in Utah/ ] 
is that the interest of a vendor in lands contracted to be sold 
is bound by the lien of a judgment against him while the contract 
is unexecuted/ to the extent it is unexecuted. In order to adopt ' 
the general rule/ this court need only recognize that "the real 
property of the judgment debtor"/ as referred to in Utah's 
judgment lien statute/ U.C.A. § 78-22-1/ includes the interest in 
real property retained by a contract vendor. 
Appellants1 reliance on the doctrine of equitable 
conversion is misplaced because that doctrine is only applied by 
courts when it is equitable that it be applied. In this case/ 
there are no such equities that would require the court to resort 
to a fiction and find that the legal titleholder of real property 
does not own the property. Appellants1 agent had notice of the 
judgment against the Barkers prior to recording the deed from the 
i 
Barkers to Hodge and the deed from Hodge to appellants/ but chose 
to proceed to record those deeds and bind title insurance on the 
property. Thus/ the equities of the transaction favor the 
i 
Clements. 
On the other hand/ to mechanically apply the doctrine 
of equitable conversion to cases where a judgment debtor has sold 
his real property on contract may provide a fool-proof method for 
many judgment debtors to dictate the terms by which his or her 
creditor must accept payment on the judgment. 
6 i 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE INTEREST OF A VENDOR OF LANDS CONTRACTED TO BE SOLD 
IS BOUND BY THE LIEN OF A JUDGMENT RECOVERED AGAINST 
HIM WHILE THE CONTRACT IS UNEXECUTED, TO THE 
EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS UNEXECUTED 
As stated above, the issue in this case is whether the 
Clement's judgment lien attached to the interest of their 
judgment debtors in the Lockhart Road property, even though the 
judgment debtors had contracted to sell the property prior to 
docketing of the judgment. The Clements submit that their 
judgment lien did attach to the Lockhart Road property to the 
extent that Diane Hodge, the contract vendee, still owed the 
judgment debtors on the Uniform Real Estate Contract, i.e., 
$54,464.90 ($87,747.40 less the $33,282.50 owed by the Barkers to 
Prudential and Continental). 
As stated in 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments § 266, "The general 
rule is that the interest of a vendor in lands contracted to be 
sold is bound by the lien of a judgment recovered against him 
while the contract is unexecuted, to the extent it is 
unexecuted." The Utah Supreme Court has not directly addressed 
the question, but dicta in a recent case exhibits recognition of 
the validity of a lien on the remaining interest in property 
owned by a contract vendor. In Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1987), the court specifically held that the term "real 
property" in Utah's judgment lien statute includes the equitable 
interest of a vendee under an installment land sale contract, and 
a judgment against a vendee docketed in the county where the land 
7 
is located imposes a lien on the vendee's interest. The court's 
opinion goes on to state as follows: 
11
 • . . A vendee who voluntarily assigns or sells his 
equitable interest to a third person or who rescinds the 
contract under which his equitable interest arises does not 
by the assignment/ sale/ or rescission extinguish creditors1 
judgment liens that attached during the vendee's ownership 
of the equitable interest. [Citations]. Nor/ for that 
matter/ is a judgment lien against the vendor's interest 
extinguished by the vendor's sale of that interest to a 
third person. Utah Farm Production Credit Association v., 
Wasatch Bank/ [734 P.2d 904], 53 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (March 
19/ 1987); First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 
429 P.2d 386 (1967)." (740 P.2d at 1257-1258) (emphasis 
added) 
Appellants argue that once the Barkers entered into the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract with Diane Hodge, the Barkers were 
left with only a personal property security interest in the 
Lockhart Road property. As between the Barkers and Hodge that 
may be an accurate assessment. When the interest of third 
persons are considered, such as the Clements in this case, the 
analysis differs. The quoted language from Butler v. Wilkinson 
clearly shows that in such a case the contract vendor does retain 
an interest in the real property. "By definition, a judgment lien 
only attaches to an interest in real property. U.C.A. § 78-22-1. 
Therefore, when the Butler opinion refers to "a judgment lien 
against the vendor's interest", it necessarily refers to an 
interest in real property. 
First Security Bank v. Rogers, supra, cited with 
approval in Butler v. Wilkinson, is instructive. In that case, 
Rogers sold certain real property in Nez Perce County on contract 
to the Eatons in December 1959. In January 1962, Nez Perce 
Roller Mills obtained a judgment against the Rogers and filed an 
8 
abstract of the judgment in the Nez Perce County recorder's 
office. Subsequently/ other persons obtained judgments against 
Rogers. In April 1965/ the Eatons deposited a lump sum final 
payment under the contract of sale into an escrow account with 
First Security Bank. First Security deposited $4,061.86 into 
court and filed an interpleader action/ interpleading all of 
Rogers1 judgment creditors. Nez Perce Roller Mills moved the 
court for summary judgment on the ground that its judgment was 
the first to be docketed in Nez Perce County and the amount of 
the judgment was in excess of the amount deposited with the 
court. The trial court granted the motion and the Idaho Supreme 
Court affirmed/ stating: 
"Appellants contend that the doctrine of equitable 
conversion must apply/ so that after execution of the 
contract with the Eatons, Rogers1 interest in the property 
was transformed from an interest in realty to an interest in 
personalty to which the judgment lien could not attach. 
The doctrine of equitable conversion is a fiction 
resting upon the fundamental rule of equity that equity 
regards that as done which ought to be done. Under the 
doctrine/ an equitable conversion takes place when a 
contract of sale of real property becomes binding on the 
parties. . . . 
. . . the doctrine is not one of universal application. 
Dean Pound has stated [quoting from Pound/ The Progress of 
the Law 1918-1919/ 33 Harv.L.Rev. 813, 831 (1920)]: 
"When we speak of conversion we are not describing a 
condition of the property for all purposes with respect 
to everybody but are giving a name to a situation 
resulting from the application of equitable doctrines 
to a state of facts between certain parties." 
The doctrine of equitable conversion generally does not 
apply to the facts of the instant case« The majority rule 
is that a judgment lien against a vendor after.the making of 
the contract of sale/ but prior to making and delivery of 
the deed/ extends to all of the vendor's interest remaining 
9 
in the land and binds the land to the extent of the unpaid 
purchase price. [Citations]." (429 P.2d at 389) 
Numerous other courts have held likewise. See, for 
example/ May v. Emerson/ 96 P. 454 (Or. 1908), which held as 
follows: 
I 
"It is beyond controversy that the title remains in the 
vendor until the actual delivery of the deed. The vendor 
still has not only the legal title, but also an interest in 
the property as security for the payment of the purchase 
price; and this interest should be and is available to a 
creditor through the lien of his judgment . . . . If the 
purchase price is fully paid/ although the deed is not 
actually delivered/ the vendor having but the naked legal 
title/ the judgment creditor can acquire no more. [Cita-
tions.] But to the extent of the unpaid purchase price the 
creditors lien will bind the property . . .." (96 P. at , 
455) 
See also, Heath v. Dodson, 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941). 
In that case Dodson obtained a judgment against Denman who had 
{ 
earlier sold real property on contract to a third party. After 
entry of the judgment Denman assigned his interest in the 
contract to Heath. When Dodson sought to execute on the 
i 
property, Heath filed an action to enjoin the sheriff's sale and 
quiet title in her as against Dodson. The Washington Supreme 
Court held: 
i 
"It is the rule in this state that a judgment recovered 
against a vendor of land, after the execution of a contract 
i 
3. May v. Emerson was followed in Heider v. Dietz, 380 P.2d 
619 (Or. 1963). Heider contains a misleading headnote which 
states: "Under 'equitable conversion,' vendors's security 
interest in land is treated as personalty not reached by 
docketing of judgment against vendor . . .." In fact, the head-
note trumpets the appellant's contention but the Oregon Supreme i 
Court rejected that contention and held that the doctrine of 
equitable conversion will not be applied "under facts making such 
application clearly improper." 
10 i 
for its sale, but prior to the making and delivery of a 
deed/ is a lien upon the legal title remaining in the vendor 
and binds the land to the extent of the unpaid purchase 
money . .. . ." (110 P., 2d at 847) 
In Monroe v. Lincoln City Emp, Credit Union/ 279 N*W.2d 
866 (Neb- 1979)/ the Olsons contracted to sell their property in 
Lancaster County on June 29/ 1977. In July, 1977, the credit 
union filed suit against the Olsons and obtained a defauJt 
judgment. The credit union docketed the judgment in Lancaster 
County on August 1/ 1977. On August 8/ 1977/ the Olsons 
transfered the property to the plaintiffs by warranty deed. As 
in the instant case/ the plaintiffs in Monroe argued that the 
Olsons' interest in the property had been equitably converted 
into personalty and therefore the judgment did not become a lien 
against the realty. The trial court agreed/ but the Nebraska 
Supreme Court did not and reversed/ holding as follows* ff[T]he 
doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply for all purposes 
and in every situation where there is a contract for the purchase 
of land. [fl]Equitable conversion is merely fa name given to 
results reached on other grounds/ not a fact from which we may 
reason for all purposes and with respect to the rights of all 
parties.1 Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harvard L.Rev./ p. 
813/ at p. 832. The present case presents a situation where the 
doctrine is clearly inapplicable." (279 N.W.2d at 867-868) The 
Nebraska Supreme Court then stated the general rule that: 
"Where a judgment is recovered in the district court 
against the vendor of real estate in the same county/ who 
has not made a deed for such real estate/ nor received the 
whole of the purchase price therefor, such judgment is a 
lien on whatever interest the vendor had in the land at the 
time the lien attached." (279 N.W.2d at 868) 
' - 11 
Mooring v. Brown/ 763 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1985), in 
which the Tenth Circuit applied Colorado law, involves 
substantially identical facts. In that case the defendants 
obtained a judgment against Cook in June 1981/ and recorded a 
transcript of the judgment in Jefferson County on June 29/ 1981. 
After the transcript of judgment was so recorded/ the defendants 
learned that Cook was the record owner of a vacant lot in 
Jefferson County. Actually/ on April 5/ 1978/ Cook had entered 
into an installment land contract with the Simpsons for the sale 
of the lot. On November 2, 1981/ Cook conveyed the lot by 
warranty deed to the Simpsons. The Simpsons later sold the 
property to the plaintiffs/ and a warranty deed conveying the 
same was recorded on March 4, 1982. In April 1982 the defendants 
commenced proceedings to levy and execute against the property in 
partial satisfaction of their judgment lien. In order to stop 
the execution sale/ plaintiffs filed their action. The Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the trial court and held that under Colorado law 
the holders of the judgment lien had a superior interest to that 
of the grantees under the subsequent deed/ even though the 
12 ( 
grantees acquired title from one who purchased the property on 
contract from the judgment debtor prior to entry of the judgment. 
See also/ Uffenheimer v. Rob Con Enterprises/ Inc./ 425 
N.Y.S.2d 856 (1980), wherein the court states: "It has long been 
the rule in this State, as in most others/ that the vendor's 
interest in realty under an executory contract of sale is subject 
to judgment liens to the extent that the purchase money remains 
unpaid." 
In this case it is stipulated that Diane Hodge owed the 
Barkers $87/747.40 under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to 
purchase the Lockhart Road property at the time the Clements 
docketed their judgment against the Barkers in Salt Lake County. 
The Barkers owed $33/282.50 on the property to two financial 
institutions. That left the Barkers with a remaining interest in 
the Lockhart Road property of $54,464.90/ and it is that amount 
to which the Clements are entitled to recover-
4. In Mooring/ a title search was conducted and title 
insurance was obtained for the benefit of the plaintiffs/ but the 
search failed to reveal the existence of the judgment lien. In 
the instant case/ a title search for the benefit of the 
Cannefaxes did reveal the judgment lien but the title insurer 
bound insurance anyway. Mooring does not address the issue of 
equitable conversion/ but the court certainly did not apply the 
doctrine. 
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B. 
T-HE CASES CITED BY APPELLANTS WHICH DISCUSS THE DOCTRINE 
OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION < 
THAT THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN ALL CASES 
OR IN THIS CASE IN PARTICULAR 
With the exception of Lach v. Deseret Bank/ 746 P.2d 
802 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah cases cited in the Brief of ' 
Plaintiffs-Appellants provide scant authority for the proposition 
that the trial court ruled wrongly in the instant case. Lach v. 
Deseret Bank is discussed in subsection C. of this Argument. * 
Appellants cite In re Estate of Willson, 28 Utah 2d 
197, 499 P.2d 1298 (1972). In that case the court determined 
that the interest of a deceased contract vendor was personal { 
property for the purposed of determining the amount of inherit-
ance taxes due from the vendor's estate. The court found that it 
was equitable to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion 
because the widow who wished her contract interest to be 
considered real property had joined with her husband to sell the 
property on contract. The facts are so disparate to those of the 
instant case that it is of no authority to a determination 
whether the doctrine should apply in the instant case. 
i 
In Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial District 
Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973), cited by appellants, 
the issue invovlved the proper disbursement of funds deposited 
i 
into court by Salt Lake City in connection with an eminent domain 
proceeding. The contract vendee of the condemned land objected 
to the trial court's order disbursing a portion of the deposited 
funds to the contract vendor. Merely as a preface to its 
discussion, this court stated the general rule that the contract 
14 « 
vendee is in equity properly regarded as the owner of property 
sold under an executory contract. That is certainly true but the 
rule is not one of universal, application. The rule does usually 
apply when the interests compared are those, of the vendor and 
vendee. The rule need not be applied when the interest of 
third-party creditors is involved as is the instant situation. 
Appellants also cite the case of Allred v. Allred, 15 
Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 (1964), which correctly states that "As 
a general rule an enforceable executory contract of sale has the 
effect of converting the interest of the vendor of real property 
to personalty." 393 P.2d at 792. The opinion in that case also 
acknowledges the rule that the doctrine of equitable conversion 
should only be applied when it is equitable that it should apply. 
Id. There is nothing in Allred to support the conclusion that 
the equitable conversion doctrine should apply to preclude a 
judgment lien from attaching to a judgment debtor-contract 
vendor's remaining interest—as measured by the amount owed him 
on the contract when the lien attaches—in property sold on 
contract. 
Respondents acknowledge that the New Mexico case cited 
by appellants, Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 595 P.2d 1199 (N.M. 
1979), supports appellants. The New Mexico Supreme Court applied 
the doctrine of equitable conversion to facts similar to the 
instant case without any apparant consideration of the competing 
equities, if any. It is just such mechanical adherence to a 
legal fiction that respondents wish this court to avoid. 
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c. 
LACH V. DESERET BANK WAS ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED 
AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED { 
Appellants also cite and rely on Lach v. Deseret Bank/ 
746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987). Lach concludes, in part, that 
under the doctrine of equitable conversion the vendor under a { 
binding earnest money agreement does not own an interest in real 
property to which a judgment lien can attach. This is, of 
course/ contrary to the ruling of the trial court in this action. 
However/ this court is not bound by the Court of 
Appeals1 decision/ and Lach should be overruled. The applicable 
holding in Lach is dicta; it is not well reasoned or supported by. 
the cases cited in the opinion; and most importantly/ it 
conflicts with this court's opinion in Butler v. Wilkinson/ 
supra, 740 P.2d 1244. 
1. 
The Lach Discussion on Equitable Conversion is Dicta 
The Lach opinionfs discussion of the doctrine of < 
equitable conversion is dicta. The facts discussed in Lach 
indicate that on November 28, 1980, an earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase agreement, for the purchase of certain property \ 
in Garfield County, was signed on November 28, 1980, by the 
Dewsnups as sellers and David Lach as buyer. On the same date 
the Dewsnups gave a quit-claim deed to the subject property in ( 
favor of Foothill Properties, a name under which David Lach 
conducted business. On December 12, 1980, Deseret Bank docketed 
a judgment againt the Dewsnups in Garfield County. i 
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In part III of the Lach opinion/ the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that "A judgment creditor cannot place a lien 
against the property of a judgment debtorfs grantee." 746 P.2d 
at 804. Since the judgment debtors quitclaimed the property to 
Lach before the judgment was docketed in Garfield County/ the 
property no longer legally belonged to the judgment debtors. The 
discussion in part IV of the opinion, concerning equitable 
conversion/ was thus unnecessary to a resolution of the appeal. 
2. 
Lach Conflicts With Butler v. Wilkinson 
In Butler v. Wilkinson/ supra, 740 P.2d 1244, this 
court expressly recognized the propriety of a judgment lien 
against the interest retained by a contract vendor. As discussed 
earlier in this brief/ the Butler v. Wilkinson opinion states: 
". . . A vendee who voluntarily assigns or sells his 
equitable interest to a third person . . . does not be the 
assignment/ [or] sale . . . extinguish creditors1 judgment 
liens that attached during the vendee's ownership of the 
equitable interest. [Citations]. Nor, for that matter/ is a 
judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by 
the vendor's sale of that interest to a third person. 
[Citations]." (740 P.2d at 1257-1258) 
The Lach discussion of equitable conversion cannot be 
reconciled with this court's statement to the contrary in Butler 
v. Wilkinson. 
3. 
The Cases Cited in the Lach Discussion of Equitable Conversion 
Do Not Compel the Conclusion Reached by 
The Court of Appeals 
The cases cited in the Lach discussion of equitable 
conversion provide scant authority for the conclusion reached by 
the Court of Appeals. The Lach opinion correctly cites Bunnell 
17 
v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 599 (1962), for the 
proposition that an earnest money agreement is a legally binding { 
executory contract for the sale of real property. However, 
Bunnell does not discuss the doctrine of equitable conversion, 
nor does it involve any issue about the validity of a judgment { 
lien. 
The other cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals are 
the same cases cited by appellants in their brief: Allred v. 
Allred, supra 15, Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791; In re Estate of 
Willson, supra, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298; and Jelco, Incorp-
orated v. Third Judicial District Court, supra, 29 Utah 2d 472, 
511 P.2d 739. 
As discussed in part B. of this Argument, those cases 
i 
apply the doctrine of equitable conversion, but on facts not at 
all similar to those of the instant case. 
D. 
THERE IS NO INEQUITY IN A RULE PERMITTING A JUDGMENT LIEN , 
TO ATTACH TO THE REMAINING INTEREST OF A 
JUDGMENT DEBTOR-CONTRACT VENDOR 
Utah's judgment lien statute, U.C.A. § 78-22-1, 
evidences a strong public policy in favor of satisfaction of < 
judgments. Indeed, a judgment lien has always been regarded as 
the highest form of security to a creditor. Belnap v. Blain, 575 
5 
P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978). A judgment creditor's lien on the < 
5. Belnap is indicative of the deference given to a judgment 
lien. In that case, this court held that a judgment lien 
attached to a debtor's property despite the fact that prior I 
encumberances exceeded the market value of the property. 
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property interest of his debtor should not be disregarded based 
on a legal fiction in the absence of strong equitable consider-
ations in favor of the debtor or his grantee. 
In the instant case there are no such equitable 
considerations • When the Barkers gave a warranty deed to Diane 
Hodge (after the Clements1 judgment against the Barkers had been 
docketed)/ Hodge had constructive notice of the existence of the 
judgment lien. So did Hodge1s grantees/ Raymond and Debra 
Cannefax. In fact/ prior to recording the deeds from the Barkers 
to Hodge and from Hodge to the Cannefaxes/ the settlement agent/ 
Security Title Agency, did a title search which disclosed the 
Clements1 judgment. At that point Hodge and the Cannefaxes/ 
through their agent, had actual knowledge of the judgment. At 
that point in time Hodge or the Cannefaxes were in a position to 
protect themselves by insisting that the judgment lien be 
cleared. Security Title could have refused to bind title 
insurance on the property or could have excepted the judgment 
lien from coverage. Instead/ for whatever reason/ the settlement 
agent chose to ignore the judgment/ bind title insurance on the 
19 
property, and record the deeds. 
The Clements recognize that their judgment lien was 
subject to existing equities of third parties in the land. For 
that reason, the Clements acknowledge that they are entitled to 
foreclose on their judgment lien only to the extent that Diane 
Hodge still owed the Barkers on the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
less the amount of prior encumberances on the property, at time 
of delivery of the warranty deed from the Barkers to her. Thus, 
Hodge did not risk the loss of her equity in the property. In 
other contexts this court has held that a judgment lien attaches 
to a debtors property only to the extent that the value of the 
property exceeds exempt amounts. See, e.g., Gray v. Stevens, 5 
Utah 2d 361, 302 P.2d 273 (1956) (judgment lien attached to value 
of homestead property in excess of amount of homestead 
exemption) . 
On the other hand, a rule recognizing the doctrine of 
equitable conversion in a case where the judgment debtor has 
retained legal title but sold the property on contract prior to 
docketing the judgment provides what may be a fool-proof method 
6. As stated by the trial court in ruling on the Clements1 
summary judgment motion: "Now, the question is, if the Court is 
to be persuaded to rule under equitable doctrines, what is or 
what isn't equitable? Who was in the better position to 
anticipate the ultimate implications of that cloud on title, and 
to deal with it at the time of purchase of the property by the 
plaintiffs in this case?" The transcript of the hearing on the 
motion is a part of the Addendum to this brief. While it is not 
a part of the record, the fact is the Clements (and their 
counsel) did not know of the existence of the Lockhart Road 
property until November 1986, more than a year after the real 
estate closing. 
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for many judgment debtors to dictate the terms by which his or 
her creditor must accept payment on the judgment. If a contract 
vendor's only remaining interest is the right to receive the 
proceeds under the contract of sale/ an otherwise judgment-proof 
debtor can sell his non-exempt real property on contract for a 
fair consideration but under terms calling for only minimal or 
modest installment payments. By such a tact/ the debtor can 
limit his judgment creditor to small monthly payments toward 
satisfaction of the judgment. 
In fact; appellants and the Lach court were wrong in 
concluding that a vendor's only remaining interest in property 
sold on contract is the right to receive the proceeds under the 
contract of sale. The contract vendor retains legal title for 
his own benefit/ subject to his vendee's interest. Unlike the 
trutee under a resulting or constructive trust/ he retains the 
right to sell that legal title/ subject to the vendee's interest. 
He retains a right to regain possession of the property upon 
default in payments by his vendee/ and he retains the right to 
prevent the vendee from committing waste to the property while 
the contract is executory. 
For much the same reasons/ it is also inaccurate to 
characterize the vendor's remaining interest as "naked legal 
title.'1 As pointed out in Belnap v. Blaifi/ supra, 575 P.2d 696/ 
at 699, the phrase "naked legal title" refers to those situations 
where the legal title holder has no beneficial interest/ such as 
where the title holder is the trustee of an express/ 
constructive, or.resulting trust. 
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As discussed/ the doctrine of equitable conversion is 
only applied when to do so is necessary to reach an equitable { 
result. Allred v. Mired, supra, 393 P.2d 791. In Security 
State Bank v. Luebke, 737 P.2d 586 (Or. 1987), the Oregon Supreme 
Court considered and rejected application of the doctrine of 
equitable conversion. In that case it became necessary to 
determine the meaning of "ownership" in the context of a statute 
enacted in 1917 which provided that "Foreclosure of a mortgage on 
real property is not barred by [the 10 year statute of limita-
tions] when . . . (2) the original mortgagor still owns the 
mortgaged property." The opinion states: 
"Although courts uniformly applied the equitable 
conversion doctrine to the vendor-purchaser relationship 
. . . the doctrine did not necessarily carry over into cases 
involving third party creditors.
 i 
'Neither this court nor other courts actually apply the 
doctrine of equitable conversion automatically. 
Equitable conversion is not invoked unless it appears 
necessary to invoke it in a particular case in order to 
accomplish equity . . .' Heider v. Dietz, 234 Or. 105, < 
112-15, 380 P.2d 619 (19637* 
. . . In 'other than vendor-purchaser cases,1 the 
equitable conversion doctrine was not 'automatically 
applie[d] in every instance of a land-sale contract1. 
[Citation] Specifically, the state of the law in 1917 was < 
that a subsequent purchaser was not regarded as the 'owner' 
for all purposes; . . . a judgment creditor of the vendor 
had a lien on the land to the extent of the unpaid purchase 
price. This is consistent with the self-evident rule that 
equitable remedies are only granted 'in a particular case in 
order to accomplish equity according to established rules of i 
equity jurisprudence.' Heider v. Dietz, supra, 234 Or. at 
112, 380 P.2d 619. For the reasons discussed above, we hold 
that use of the equitable conversion doctrine to determine 
'ownership' under ORS 88.120 is inappropriate. For the 
purpose of ORS 88.120, Luebke 'still owns the mortgaged 
property.'" { 
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Respondents Donald and Ruth Clement submit that 
appellants are asking this court to apply the doctrine of 
equitable conversion in an "automatic" fashion v/ithout analysis 
of whether the facts of the case made It an appropriate one for 
application of the doctrine. The equitable conversion doctrine 
has never been a "hard and fast" rule and should not become one. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the stipulated facts and the arguments set 
forth in this brief, respondents Donald and Ruth Clement respect-
fully submit that this court should affirm the Order and Summary 
Judgment entered by the trial court, and submit that they should 
be awarded their costs on appeal. 
Lted this ^ 'A Dated this -^  'r\ day of July, 1988. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By / jfom /f^#A-^ 
Steven H. Lybberjf 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Donald W. Clement and Ruth L. 
Clement 
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ADDENDUM 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 j 
2. STIPULATED FACTS 
3. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS [ON DEFENDANTS1 MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT] 
4. ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I 
( 
( 
( 
i 
i 
i 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 
From the time the judgment of the district court or 
circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the 
clerk of the district court of the county it becomes a lien 
upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not 
exempt from execution, in the county in which the judgment 
is entered, owned by him at the time or by him thereafter 
acquired during the existence of said lien. A transcript of 
judgment rendered in a district court or circuit court of 
this state, in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed 
in the office of the clerk of the district court of any 
other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall have, 
for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same force and 
effect as a judgment entered in the district court in such 
county. The lien shall continue for eight years unless the 
judgment is previously satisfied or unless the enforcement 
of the judgment is stayed on appeal by the execution of a 
sufficient undertaking as provided by law, in which case the 
lien of the judgment ceases. 
BRUCE E. COKE, Bar No. 0694 
STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and 
DEBRA CANNEFAX, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L. ) 
CLEMENT, ] 
Defendants. ] 
STIPULATED FACTS 
Civil No. C87-6232 
1 Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Rodney M. 
Pipella, and defendants, by and through their attorneys, Steven 
H. Lybbert and Bruce E. Coke of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, stipulate 
to the following facts. In doing so, counsel agree that other 
facts not stipulated to may be relevant to the issues raised in 
the pleadings. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. On August 28, 1981, George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila 
M. Barker ("the Barkers") were fee simple owners of the real 
property described in paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint ("the Lockhart Road property"). 
2. On August 28, 1981, the Barkers entered into a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract with Diane Hodge for sale of the 
Lockhart Road property for the sum of $160,000.00, payable 
$40,000.00 down and the balance over a period of time with 
interest. 
3. At the time of the contract sale from the Barkers 
to Diane Hodge, there existed prior mortgage loan obligations 
against the property in favor of Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association ("Prudential") and Continental Bank and Trust 
Company ("Continental"). 
4. On August 31, 1981, Ms. Hodge caused a Notice of 
Contract to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder as 
Entry No. 3600195 at Book 5287, Page 315. 
5. On August 15, 1985, defendants Donald W. Clement 
and Ruth L. Clement obtained a Judgment in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court of Uintah County against the Barkers in the 
amount of $70,526.00. 
6. On August 19, 1985, defendants1 Judgment was 
docketed with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of
 { 
Salt Lake County in Docket Book 200 at Page 153. 
7. Defendants1 Judgment against the Barkers was not 
appealed. < 
8. On September 25, 1985, iiwediately prior to the 
transaction described in the paragraphs which follow, the Barkers 
held legal title to the Lockhart Road property, subject to Diane < 
-2-
( 
Hodge*s interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.1 
9. On September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge owed $87,747.40 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Barkers. The prior 
obligations to Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50. 
10. On September 25, 1985, the Barkers gave a Warranty 
Deed to the Property to Diane Hodge. The Warranty Deed was 
recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985 
as Entry No. 4142674 at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1268. 
11. On September 25, 1985, at the time of delivery of 
the Warranty Deed referred to in paragraph 10, Diane Hodge paid 
the Barkers $45,000.00, and the Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a credit 
of $9,464.94. The mortgage loan balance in favor of Prudential 
in the sum of $5,960.20 was paid off, as was the mortgage loan 
balance in favor of Continental in the sum of $27,322.30. 
12. Also on September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge gave a 
Warranty Deed to the Property to plaintiffs Raymond P.L. Cannefax 
and Debra Cannefax. The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt 
Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985, as Entry No. 4142675 
at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1270. 
13. The two transactions discussed above—the transfer 
of title from the Barkers to Diane Hodge, and the transfer of 
title from Diane Hodge to plaintiffs—took place at a single real 
estate closing. A true and correct copy of the U.S. Department 
1. After entering into the contract with Ms. Hodge, the Barkers 
gave quit claim deeds to the property to other people named 
Barker—presumably their children. On or before September 25, 
1985, but prior to the other transactions of September 25, the 
Barkers received back quit claim deeds to the property from their 
quit claim grantees. 
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of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement between 
Diane Hodge and plaintiffs is attached hereto. 
14. A title search conducted by the settlement agent, 
Surety Title Agency, between closing on September 25, 1985 and 
recording on September 26, 1985 disclosed defendants1 Judgment 
against the Barkers. 
Dated this JZ)A day of December, 1987. 
Ro£rtS*V M. Pipella 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Dated this J~* day of December, 1987. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By / ^ H ^ 
SCeven H. Lybtfert 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and 
DE3RA CANNEFAX, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
- v s -
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH 
L. CLEMENT, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C87-6232 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
DEFENDANTS* MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
* * * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
February 29, 1988 
* * * 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendants. 
RODNEY M. PIPELLA 
643 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
STEVEN 3. LYBBSRT 
350 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
COPY 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Cannefax vs. Clement, C87-6232. Counsel 
3- will state an appearance for the record, please, 
4 MR. LYBBERT: Steven Lybbert for the defendants. 
5 MR. PIPELLA: Rodney Pipella for the plaintiffs. 
6 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
7 MR. LYBBERT: We would move for summary judgment 
8 both as to the complaint and on the counterclaim for 
9 declaratory relief that has been filed. The parties have, I 
10 believe, stipulated — they certainly stipulated to facts, and 
11 I think the facts they have stipulated to are sufficient to 
12 resolve all the issues involved on both the complaint and 
13 counterclaim. 
14 Briefly, to paraphrase those facts, Mr. and 
15 Mrs. Barker owned a piece of property. They entered into a 
16 uniform real estate contract with Dianne Hodge to sell that 
17 property. Thereafter, the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Clement, 
18 obtained a judgment against the Barkers, and docketed that 
19 judgment in Salt Lake County. About a month after the 
20 judgment had been docketed Dianne Hodge paid off the contract 
21 and obtained a deed to the property, and on that same day she 
22 sold the property again by warranty deed to the plaintiffs, 
23 the Cannefaxes. At the time that Dianne Hodge obtained her 
24 warranty deed from the Barkers, and at the time that she gave 
25 a warranty deed to the plaintiffs, the Cannefaxes, she owed 
about $88,000 on the contract. There was $33,000, 
approximately, owing to a couple of lenders who had first and 
second position. At the closing those two lenders were paid 
off. The Barkers gave Dianne Hodge a $9,000 credit, and she 
paid the remaining $45,000 to the Barkers. The fact that the 
judgment lien — excuse me, the fact that the judgment had 
been docketed was discovered between closing and recording of 
the various deeds the next day. So there is — 
THE COURT: What was the amount of the judgment 
obtained by the plaintiffs? 
MR. LYBBERT: Approximately $70,000. 
I believe the issue is whether that judgment, when 
it was docketed in Salt Lake County, became a lien on the 
interest that the Barkers retained in the property — they 
certainly had legal title to the property — it is my position 
and I believe that the case law and treatises support me, that 
the general rule is that when a judgment is obtained against a 
person who owns property, who has sold that property on 
contract, then the lien attaches to the property, to the 
extent that the contract remains unpaid, which in this case, 
as of the date that they had actual knowledge of the judgment 
and the fact it had been docketed in Salt Lake County, it 
was — after you take away the $33,000 that was owed to the 
two prior lenders, that leaves $54,000. 
I believe the determinative case is Butler vs. 
1 Wilkinson, which is discussed in both my memorandum and my 
2 reply to Plaintiff's opposition to the motion. It clearly 
3 recognizes the possibility of a judgment lien against the 
4 contract vendor's interest, and clearly states that a judgment 
5 lien against the vendor's interest is not extinguished by the 
6 vendor's sale of that interest to a third person. 
7 My memorandum will certainly go into more detail 
8 than I want to now, unless you want more detail. I feel 
9 confident that the memoranda that I submitted states my 
10 position pretty clearly. The plaintiffs suggest that the 
11 Clements' remedy should have been to perhaps garnish Dianne 
12 Hodge, but that ignores the fact they didn't know that the 
13 Barkers owned this property, this particular piece of 
14 property, until after they docketed their judgment in Salt 
15 Lake County, and in fact after — long after the property had 
16 then been sold — or a deed had been given from the Barkers to 
17 the Hodges and — the Barkers to Dianne Hodge and from Dianne 
18 Hodge to the Cannefaxes. 
19 THE COURT: Counsel, one more time, in addition to 
20 the factual transaction, outline for the Court, put the dates 
21 in. Start from the time that the Barkers sell, and then 
22 indicate the dates when the Clements1 obtained their judgment, 
23 when it was recorded, and then when the property was sold 
24 again. 
25 MR. LYBBERT: The Barkers sold the property on 
1 
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contract on August 28, 1981. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: And that sale was to Hodges? 
LYBBERT: Right, to Hodge. 
COURT: And that was when? 
LYBBERT: August 28, 1981. 
COURT: Go ahead. 
LYBBERT: On August 15, 1985, the Clements 
obtained their judgment for $70,526. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Was it recorded again? 
LYBBERT: It was recorded or docketed in Salt 
Lake County four days later, on August 19, 1985. 
THE COURT: The Clements obtained and recorded a 
judgment for how much? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
15, 1985, and 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
LYBBERT: $70,526. 
COURT: Against? 
LYBBERT: Mr. and Mrs. George Barker. 
COURT: Both? 
LYBBERT: Yes. ! 
! i 
COURT: And that occurred on what date? 
LYBBERT: They obtained the.judgment on August 
that was in Uintah County. 
COURT: It is the recording that's critical. 
LYBBERT: August 19, 1985. 
COURT: August 19, 1985? 
LYBBERT: Correct. 
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1 THE COURT: Go ahead. Take it on through. 
2 MR. LYBBERT: About 36 days later, on September 25, 
3 1985, the Barkers gave a warranty deed to Dianne Hodge, and on 
4 that same day and immediately thereafter Dianne Hodge gave a 
5 warranty deed to Mr. and Mrs. Cannefax. 
6 THE COURT: The Barkers gave their warranty deed on 
7 what, September — 
8 MR. LYBBERT: 25. 
9 THE COURT: 1985? 
10 MR. LYBBERT: Correct. 
11 THE COURT: To the Clements? 
12 MR. LYBBERT: No, to Dianne Hodge. The Clements are 
13 the judgment creditors. 
14 THE COURT: What did she do with it? 
15 MR. LYBBERT: On that same day she gave a warranty 
16 deed to the plaintiffs in this action, Mr. and Mrs. Cannefax. 
17 THE COURT: On what date? 
18 MR. LYBBERT: Also September 25, 1985. 
19 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
20 MR. LYBBERT: Those are the dates and transactions 
21 that the parties have stipulated to. It is not in the 
22 stipulated facts, but then it was probably late 1987, fall of 
23 1987, that the Clements discovered the existence of this 
24 property, and sought to foreclose on the judgment lien, and in 
25 response the Cannefaxes brought this action to find that they 
1 have title ~ 
2 THE COURT: Superior — 
3 MR- LYBBERT: Superior to the judgment lien. 
4 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
5 MR. LYBBERT: Back then, on September 25, 1985, 
6 there was a balance due on that uniform real estate contract 
7 of approximately — I think it was $88,000. And at that time 
8 there were obligations owed to two different lending 
9 institutions, totaling $33,000. So it is my position that the 
10 Barkers, as of the date that — the judgment debtors, Barkers, 
11 as of the date they gave the deed to Hodge, still had an 
12 interest attached by the judgment lien of $54,000, 
13 THE COURT: Is that the amount in dispute today? 
14 MR. LYBBERT: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: So the Clements are now trying to go 
16 against the property in the amount of $54,000? 
17 MR. LYBBERT: Thatfs correct. I am rounding 
18 everything to the nearest thousand. 
19 THE COURT: Against the Cannefaxes? 
20 MR. LYBBERT: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Anything further? 
22 MR. LYBBERT: No. 
23 THE COURT: Counsel? 
24 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, the argument of the 
25 Cannefaxes is that at the time the uniform real estate 
1 contract was entered into, in August of 1981, between the 
2 Barkers and Dianne Hodge, that equitable conversion took 
3 place, the theory of equitable conversion should be applied to 
4 determine the interest of the parties on that date, and for 
5 the remainder of the life of the contract. 
6 THE COURT: What would have a title check 
7 accomplished on this? 
8 MR. PIPELLA: The title check at that time would 
9 have disclosed that the Barkers held title to the property. 
10 Dianne Hodge at the time that she bought the property in 
11 August of 1981 had recorded a notice of interest, disclosing 
12 the interest of her contract. 
13 THE COURT: But supposing that on the morning of the 
14 transaction, September 25, 1985, there had been an update on 
15 the title policy, would not the recorded lien have been 
16 exposed? 
17 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, I think as part of the 
18 stipulated facts the title company that had done the date. 
19 down, from the date of the prior commitment to the date of 
20 closing, did discover the Clement judgment as being docketed 
21 against the Barkers. 
22 THE COURT: Doesn't that put a buyer on notice? 
23 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, our position is that 
24 equitable conversion makes Dianne Hodge the owner of the real 
25 property, and that what the Barkers had at the time they 
executed the contract was a personal property interest, a 
security Interest. 
THE COURT: Supposing they had backed out on the 
deal. 
MR. PIPELLA: Who had backed out on the deal? 
THE COURT: The Barkers. Would they not still have 
retained title of the property subject to the recorded lien? 
MR. PIPELLA: They couldn't have backed out on the 
deal after August of 1981. 
THE COURT: Why not? 
MR. PIPELLA: Because they had entered into a 
uniform real estate contract and they owed Dianne Hodge the 
deed. If she performed, she could have sued for specific 
performance. 
THE COURT: If for some reason they had developed 
sellers1 remorse or some other problem arose and they said, 
Sue us, we don't want to go through with this deal, we have an 
emotional attachment to the property, we want to give it to 
our grandchildren, we don't want to go through with it, you 
sue us, what would have been the basis for the lawsuit, absent 
an action for specific performance? What would have been — 
MR. PIPELLA: Dianne Hodge bought the property, and 
was entitled to obtain the benefit of her bargain. The 
uniform real estate contract provides three separate remedies 
in paragraph 16, section 16, for nonperformance. Paragraph 
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1 16(a) provides a forfeiture provision, (b) allows the seller 
2 to sue the buyer for back installments, and paragraph 16(c) 
3 allows the contract seller to convey title and foreclose on 
4 the title as a mortgage — foreclose on the contract as a 
5 mortgage. At the time, in September or August of 1985, at the 
6 time that the Clements obtained their judgment, Dianne Hodge 
7 had paid 50 percent of the purchase price, 
8 THE COURT: When did she enter into the contract 
9 with the Barkers? 
10 MR. PIPELLA: In 1981. 
11 THE COURT: When? 
12 MR. PIPELLA: August. 
13 THE COURT: When? 
14 MR. PIPELLA: August 29. 
15 THE COURT: That was the day after — that was 
16 several days after the judgment was recorded against the 
17 property? 
18 MR. PIPELLA: No. Dianne Hodge bought the property 
19 in August of 1981. The Clements docketed their judgment in 
20 August of 1985, four years later. And then Dianne Hodge, in 
21 September of 1985, roughly 30 days following the docketing of 
22 the Clements' judgment in Salt Lake County, resold the 
23 property to my clients. In that resale transaction, the 
24 Cannefaxes refinanced the property, and paid cash. Therefore, 
25 Dianne Hodge had enough money to pay off the Cannefaxes. She 
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1 paid them off in 1985, on a contract, that she had entered 
2 into with in 1981. Dianne Hodge had been in the possession of 
3 the property, had paid taxes. The Barkers couldn't have 
4 backed out at that particular point in time. Dianne Hodge had 
5 used it as her residence for four or five years. 
6 Our argument, your Honor, is at the time the uniform 
7 real estate contract is entered into, in August of 1981, that 
8 Dianne Hodge became the owner of the real property, and the 
9 doctrine of equitable conversion so states. The doctrine of 
10 equitable conversion is well described in the Butler vs. 
11 Wilkinson case, which is cited in both of our memorandums. 
12 The uniform real estate contract is characterized in Butler 
13 vs. Wilkinson as a financing instrument, with the interest of 
14 the vendor, in this case the Barkers, being that as a 
15 mortgagee, just like any other mortgage holder. You have a 
16 personal property interest. The vendee is really the owner, 
17 and in Butler vs. Wilkinson they discuss that ownership 
18 interest. They have the risk of loss. They are the ones that 
19 are required to obtain insurance. If the property were 
20 damaged or destroyed, they would be the ones that would suffer 
21 that loss post-contract. They are also the ones that have the 
22 right to occupy the property. 
23 THE COURT: Had she in fact been in occupancy 
24 exclusively for that four-year period of time? 
25 MR. PIPELLA: When the contract closed in 1981, she 
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1 moved in and used it for her residence. At the time that she 
2 sold the property to my clients, she and her husband I believe 
3 had been transferred out of state, and were living in 
4 Minnesota, which I believe is where they were contacted — 
5 isn't it Minnesota? 
6 MR. LYBBERT: That's correct, 
7 MR. PIPELLA: Living in Minnesota in 1985. She had 
8 been occupying the property. Now, in the instant case, in 
9 this case, we are — if you follow Mr. Lybbertfs arguments, we 
10 are asked to treat a contract different than other security 
11 interests in a particular piece of property. A uniform real 
12 estate contract, in our position, your Honor, is nothing more 
13 than another method to finance the sale of property. And it 
14 should be treated as such. Utah code, at 78-22-1, dealing 
15 with judgment liens and when and on what property they become 
16 judgments, what property they become liens once docketed, 
17 describes that the judgment becomes a lien on the real 
18 property owned by the judgment debtor. Your Honor, my 
19 client — Dianne Hodge was the owner. I don't think that we 
20 can look at that word "owner" and say that there were two 
21 owners of the real property at the time that the Clements 
22 docketed their judgment. 
23 THE COURT: Do you have a legal and an equitable 
24 owner? 
25 MR. PIPELLA: Yes. You have an equitable owner of 
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the real property, which was Dianne Hodge. And the Barkers at 
that time had a security interest in the contract. At the 
time the judgment was*docketed, Dianne Hodge had paid almost 
50 percent of the property value. 
THE COURT: Whose name was the property still in? 
MR. PIPELLA: The property in 1985, at the time the 
judgment was docketed, title was still vested in the Barkers. 
THE COURT: The Court's next question is, would 
it — do not the recording statutes operate to put a buyer on 
notice that even up until the moment the transaction is 
finalized there ought to be an update on the title check of 
the property? Wouldn't an addendum to the title of that 
property have reflected and sent up red flags to your clients 
that the title to the property they were buying was 
encumbered, there was a cloud on it, there was a question 
about ownership? 
MR. PIPELLA: Well, the ownership, your Honor — the 
answer to your question is yes, because there in fact was a 
search done, and they did search the title name, the Barkers 
and Dianne Hodge, and they searched the title judgment docket 
records for the name of my client as well. 
THE COURT: Did the recorded judgment — 
MR. PIPELLA: The docketed judgment I believe did 
show up in that search. 
THE COURT: What would a reasonable, prudent buyer 
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1 do in that case? Wouldn't they have required the seller of 
2 that property to impound funds or to take other steps to 
3 guaranty the full value of the purchase? 
4 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, my clients weren't aware 
5 of the docketing of the judgment. Now, the title insurance 
6 company that closed the transaction was their agent, was also 
7 the agent for Dianne Hodge. Our position is that if a uniform 
8 real estate contract is a financing instrument, and Dianne 
9 Hodge was the equitable owner of the real property, and the 
10 Barkers held the personal property interest — 
11 THE COURT: And were the legal owners. 
12 MR. PIPELLA: Had fee title — not fee title, but 
13 record title — that the docketing of the judgment says it is 
14 a lien against real property owned by the judgment debtor. At 
15 this particular point in time, all that the Barkers had was a 
16 security interest, and it was personal property. What I am 
17 requesting and our point is that if Barkers had given a deed 
18 and taken back a note and deed of trust, we wouldn't be having 
19 this particular argument. Or if they had given a deed and 
20 taken back an all-inclusive note and deed of trust and wrapped 
21 the two prior encumbrances, we wouldn't be having this 
22 argument. It is inequitable, where you have a contract sale, 
23 to treat it any differently than you would where the seller, 
24 the vendor, had given a deed and taken back a note and deed of 
25 trust. In both cases, your Honor, where he had taken back a 
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1 note and deed of trust or had sold the property on contract/ 
2 he has the identical interest. He has a personal property 
3 interest in the property itself, and the judgment doesn't 
4 attach. 
5 One of the items that Mr. Lybbert and the defendants 
6 don't bring up is that what if Dianne Hodge had just 
7 accelerated her payments? What if she had paid it off? What 
8 would her exposure be? Is it incumbent on her, before she 
9 makes every installment, to run and have the title checked? I 
10 assert, your Honor, that --
11 THE COURT: Judgment against the property. 
12 MR. PIPELLA: In this case it is a judgment against 
13 the seller. But it puts the contract buyer in a position 
14 where they can't freely make the payments and can't freely 
15 deal with the seller for fear that a judgment comes of record 
16 against the seller, and they have to go down and check the 
17 record every time they make a payment. If Dianne Hodge had 
18 come into a windfall and had made the payment in this 
19 particular case, we may still be having the very same 
20 argument. That, your Honor, is inequitable. It is unfair. 
21 You have to treat the contract buyer as the owner of the real 
22 property, treat the seller as a mortgagee. That's what he is. 
23 In this particular case the Barkers — if Dianne Hodge had 
24 defaulted in August of 1985, the Barkers, according to the 
25 terms of the contract, would have to have conveyed the 
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1 property, according to the terms of section 16(c), to Dianne 
2 Hodge, and then foreclosed on the property as a mortgage. 
3 Your Honor, I assert that what the — that what the 
4 Barkers had at the time was only a personal property interest, 
5 and that the cases that have been cited on our behalf describe 
6 the interest• The three cases that we have relied upon 
7 principally are Butler vs. Wilkinson, in re: Willson's estate, 
8 and Allred vs. Allred. In those three cases, your Honor, it 
9 describes the interest of the contract seller. The interest 
10 of the contract seller is personal property, is that of a 
11 mortgagee. 
12 The statute 78-22-1 says real property owned by the 
13 judgment debtor. If we have — if we are to give effect to 
14 the cases that we have cited, and apply that to 78-22-1, in 
15 determining whether or not — you know, who is the owner, and 
16 against whom would a judgment attach as a lien to the 
17 property, I think the only conclusion is, your Honor, that the 
18 real property interest was held by Dianne Hodge, and the fact 
19 that a judgment was docketed against the Barkers prior to the 
20 time she paid them off and took the deed should be treated 
21 just as if the Barkers held a mortgage on the property. 
22 In that particular case, if they held a mortgage on 
23 the property, held a security interest, then a judgment 
24 docketed against them would not be a lien on the property. 
25 Your Honor, I am saying if there was a mortgage, it should be 
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treated just like — pardon me, the mere fact there was a 
contract shouldn't make any difference to our determination 
here. The contract, as far as the Barkers were concerned, 
should be treated as a mortgage. 
THE COURT: Supposing the buyer had defaulted 
someplace along the line, they had been in possession of the 
property four or five years, and fall on hard times, and 
defaulted, then what is the legal position of the original 
seller? 
MR. PIPELLA: Sir, your Honor, depending on the 
amount of the payment that has been received, I can't quote 
you chapter and verse from the Utah cases that establish when 
a forfeiture is proper, but part of the problem we are faced 
with here is that these land sale contracts have been treated 
as executory contracts. If there is a default by the buyer, 
the seller is excused from performance. In Utah, dealing with 
land sale contracts, it is not always true that the sellers 
performance is excused by a default by the buyer. In this 
particular case, Dianne Hodge paid 25 percent down when she 
bought the property in 1981. It was $160,000 purchase price. 
She paid $40,000 down. And depending on if — depending on 
the date that she would have defaulted after that, it is 
highly unlikely that one month following the date of her 
default that the Court would have allowed a forfeiture. 
THE COURT: What about four years? 
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1 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, she had paid more money 
2 after four years, because by the time we got to September of 
3 1985, she had reduced that $120,000 balance that was on the 
4 contract in August of 1981 down to $87,000. She had paid 
5 almost 50 percent of the purchase price in four years. And 
6 under no circumstances would a Utah court allow a forfeiture 
7 when the buyer had paid 50 percent of the purchase price over 
8 four years. The Court would require that the seller foreclose 
9 on that contract like a mortgage, utilizing 16(c). 
10 Our position is that — as well as one of the other 
11 points we make in our memorandums, was that the contract was 
12 no longer executory, in that performance, default in August of 
13 1985, at the time that the Clements obtained their judgment, 
14 would not have excused the Barkers1 performance. In order to 
15 have foreclosed on Dianne Hodge at that time, the contract 
16 required and the Utah case law would have required them to 
17 convey the property to Dianne Hodge and foreclose on that 
18 contract as a mortgage, pursuant to 16(c) of that contract. 
19 And so the contract was not even an executory contract in 
20 August of 1985. 
21 THE COURT: As a practical matter, if the Court 
22 ruled in your favor, what would be the remedies of all of the 
23 parties? 
24 MR. PIPELLA: Your. Honor, the remedy that would 
25 exist in this case for the Clements would be the same remedy 
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that would exist for the Clements if the Barkers had taken 
back a note and a mortgage. I recognize the fact that the 
Clements weren't aware of this contract sale at the time they 
had docketed their judgment. I haven't taken their deposition 
on the matter, because I didn't figure that was ever really 
that important in order to argue this particular motion. 
But their remedy, the cases also that we have cited, 
in particular the Dahl vs. Prince case that's mentioned in our 
memorandum, is that a judgment creditor isn't a bona fide 
purchaser, and that a judgment creditor takes the debtor's 
interest as he has it in the property. He doesn't have any 
better position, doesn't have any worse position, because he 
obtains his judgment. 
The remedy that I see on behalf of the Clements is 
that they — again, it is cited in our memorandum, proposed in 
our memorandum — is that they just execute on the note, which 
they have every right to do. They can take a supplementary 
hearing, through supplementary proceedings, find out what the 
assets are, and they can execute on the contract, and take the 
Barkers' position. And once they are in that position, then 
they can demand payment from Dianne Hodge. 
One of the cases that was cited by the defendant is 
an Oregon case by the name of May vs. Emerson. In that 
particular case — it is again mentioned in both memoranda — 
and it has been utilized by the defendants to support their 
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1 position that the judgment debtor — judgment creditor has a 
2 lien on the real property — but the remainder of the case 
3 says, yes, he does have a lien, but in order to get the 
4 contract buyer to make the payments to the judgment creditor, 
5 the judgment creditor has to put himself in a position of a 
6 contract seller. He has to execute on the contract, and put 
7 himself into the position of the seller. Then he can demand 
8 payments from the buyer. If the buyer happens to pay off the 
9 contract prior to the time that the judgment creditor places 
10 himself in a position of the seller, so be it. It is not the 
11 buyer's responsibility to collect money for the judgment 
12 creditor. 
13 THE COURT: Anything further? 
14 MR. PIPELLA: I think we have talked about 
15 everything I had in mind, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Response? 
17 MR. LYBBERT: Just briefly, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Answer the Court's question posed to 
19 Counsel. If the Court rules in favor of the Cannefaxes, as a 
20 practical matter how is the case going to unravel? 
21 MR. LYBBERT: There is no more remedy. As of the 
22 day after that closing, back in September of 1985, when the 
23 money was disbursed, unless their judgment lien had some 
24 value, they really had no further remedy, the Barkers -- this 
25 is not in the stipulated facts, either, but they are now with 
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1 bankruptcy, no way to go back against them, look to them for 
2 further relief. I didnft quite follow how Mr. Pipella 
3 suggested that we go after the Hodges. 
4 THE COURT: Nor did the Court. 
5 MR. LYBBERT: They sold their interest. She sold 
6 her interest, I should say. I think there is no more remedy 
7 for the Clements. 
8 THE COURT: Counsel, you are just ready to say 
9 something. 
10 MR. PIPELLA: I am. I am sorry. 
11 MR. LYBBERT: I would be glad to let him interrupt. 
12 THE COURT: Go ahead. We have allowed an hour for 
13 the hearing.. The Court anticipates that the ruling today is 
14 going to be dispositive of all of the issues. Let's resolve 
15 it to your satisfaction as far as argument goes• 
16 MR. PIPELLA: I think what prompted me to want to 
17 say something was the remedy against Hodge. I don't think 
18 that there is a remedy against the Hodges. I think the remedy 
19 for the Clements was always against the Barkers, except they 
20 had received payment from Dianne Hodge prior to executing on 
21 the contract and placing themselves in the Barkers' position. 
2 2 THE COURT: They become a conduit, a legal conduit 
23 for the Clements to go against the Hodges, and if that legal 
24 J conduit is now insulated by a bankruptcy, then they have no 
25 remedy against Hodge. 
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MR. PIPELLA: Hodge paid all of the money. She paid 
in full, in August of 1985. And the Barkers got the money. 
The issue is now the defendants are seeking to enforce their 
lien against the real property. 
THE COURT: The Court understands that. If the 
Court rules in favor of the Cannefaxes today, then what do the 
Clements do to obtain satisfaction on the $54,000 judgment? 
And talk about that for a moment as you argue to the Court the 
purpose of recording statutes. What is the underlying purpose 
of the recording statutes in this state? 
MR. PIPELLA: The statute 78-22-1 specifies at the 
time the judgment is docketed that the judgment is on all of 
the real property owned by the debtor. And if — and when 
someone — when you have — I am going to argue in the 
hypothetical here, because I don't think the Barkers had a 
real property interest at the time the judgment was 
docketed — when that judgment is docketed, it becomes a lien 
on all the real property. When somebody else buys the 
property from the judgment creditor, or makes a loan to the 
judgment creditor, it is put on notice — 
THE COURT: It is subject to a lien. 
MR. PIPELLA: But my position is that Dianne Hodge 
bought the property from the Barkers four years prior, and 
became the owner at the time that she bought the property, and 
the only reason we are having this discussion is over the 
22 
1 financing method that was chosen by the parties at closing. 
2 If there had been an all-Inclusive note and deed of trust 
3 utilized or if the Barkers had taken a third note, a note 
4 secured by a third deed of trust, we wouldn't be having this 
5 argument, this discussion, and my position is that the 
6 contract is just like a note and a mortgage. It is a security 
7 instrument. The fact that the judgment was docketed doesn't 
8 affect Dianne Hodge's interest in the real property. 
9 THE COURT: Counsel? 
10 MR, LYBBERT: Is there a question pending? 
11 THE COURT: Do you have anything else you would like 
12 to say? 
13 MR. LYBBERT: Yes. The fact is that they didn't /)«:] 
14 sell this property by contract." By doing so, they retained 
15 legal title. I really, truly believe the supreme court has 
16 spoken to the matter, Butler vs. Wilkinson case, where they 
17 clearly recognized the existence and the validity of a 
18 judgment lien against the vendor's remaining interest. They 
19 say — let me quote this again, since we do have a little 
20 time. "Nor for that matter is a judgment lien against the 
21 vendor's interest extinguished by the vendor's sale of that 
22 interest." By definition, a judgment lien only attaches to 
23 real property, not personal property. Therefore, when the 
24 Butler opinion refers to a judgment lien against the vendor's 
25 interest, it necessarily refers to an interest in real 
23 
property. 
Therefore, the supreme court is saying that the 
vendor in fact does retain an ownership interest in real 
property, and not just a security interest, at least as 
between — when you bring this third party, this judgment 
creditor into the situation, as between a two-party situation 
where the only two interests you are talking about is that of 
the vendor and the vendee, then application of this doctrine 
of equitable conversion may and frequently is found to be 
perfectly appropriate. But when you are talking about the 
interest of a third person, then you are not going to 
automatically apply that doctrine of equitable conversion. In 
this case you certainly don't. 
We are not asking, we are not suggesting that we are 
entitled to foreclose up to the full amount of the value of 
the property or even up to the judgment amount. What we think 
we are entitled to is that amount that was due, not even on 
the date that the judgment was docketed, but on the date a 
month later when the double closing occurred and Barkers gave 
title, gave a deed to Clement, and Clement gave a deed to the 
Cannefaxes. That's the date we are looking to, to determine 
what interest Barkers still had that was subject to this 
judgment lien. That amount is the $54,000 we talked about in 
the memorandum. 
Mr. Pipella has cited some cases where the Utah 
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court has applied the doctrine of equity conversion- In each 
of those cases it is a case of looking between the vendor and 
the vendee how you are going to characterize the vendor's 
interest. Those cases, which have considered the issue we are 
talking about today, whether the judgment lien attaches to the 
vendor's interest, have acknowledged the existence of the 
doctrine of equity conversion and said we are not going to 
apply it in this case. It is an equitable doctrine, not to be 
applied in every instance, and almost without exception. 
There are cases that have just flat out, without much 
analysis, said the judgment lien doesn't attach to a vendor's 
remaining interest. The majority rule, as I have stated, I 
have quoted in my memorandum from Am Jur, is — 
THE COURT: Is this in your reply? 
MR. LYBBERT: No. It is in my initial memorandum. 
THE COURT: What page? 
MR. LYBBERT: 46 Am Jur 2nd. 
THE COURT: Which page? 
MR. LYBBERT: Page 5 of my original memorandum. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LYBBERT: Have you read that? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LYBBERT: I will submit it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Submit? Or else forever hold your 
peace. You have whatever opportunity you would like to 
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1 respond. The Court has relaxed considerably this morning its 
2 customary rules on arguing motions for summary judgment, 
3 because the Court's ruling this morning is going to be 
4 determinative of the case, and you should have every 
5 opportunity, both of you, to argue whatever you would like, 
6 irrespective of the standard format in these matters. What is 
7 your client's remedy, as a practical matter, if the Court 
8 rules against him? 
9 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, the client's remedy is 
10 probably a claim against the title insurance, 
11 THE COURT: And the Court keeps coming back to that 
12 position in its attempt to rule properly on this case. What 
13 is the underlying purpose of a recording statute? And if that 
14 in fact does not put the owner — or the buyer, rather, or the 
15 buyer's agent on notice that there is a cloud on title and a 
16 contingency ought to be made to remove that cloud, then the 
17 recording statutes really have no effect. 
18 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, and I agree. But all of 
19 my comments have been made that the Barkers simply did not 
20 have an interest to which the lien attached at the time the 
21 judgment was docketed. It was a personal property interest. 
22 They were mortgagees. 
23 THE COURT: Would your argument be any stronger if 
24 the dispute were between the original buyer and the original 
25 seller as opposed to a third party now, as Counsel has 
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alluded? 
MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, if — t h e application of 
equitable conversion between the seller and the buyer has 
always applied to a third party. In the cases that have been 
cited, in Butler, we are looking at a third-party judgment 
creditor. In the Kartchner case, we use the State Tax 
Commission as an adverse party, depending on whether or not 
the seller's interest was held to be personal or real 
property. It always applied to a third party, as between the 
seller and the buyer. If no third party ever makes a claim or 
there is no possibility that a third party would make a claim, 
then there is no need to argue that equitable conversion has 
taken place. The argument is there to protect the buyer 
against potential claims made against his seller, in order to 
protect him, to give him, the buyer, the benefit of the 
bargain, the benefit of his bargain. 
MR. LYBBERT: One last word, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. LYBBERT: In the Butler vs. Wilkinson case, they 
considered the doctrine of equitable conversion and found it 
applicable in order to find that a judgment lien could attach 
to the vendee's interest. That certainly doesn't mean that — 
it just doesn't mean there is only one of those two interests 
that a judgment lien can attach to. In this case it is easy 
to separate and determine, and we stipulated what the vendor's 
27 
1 interest was, financially speaking, and what the vendee's 
2 interest was. The vendor's interest was that $54,000 that was 
3 still owed him at the time of this closing in September of 
4 1985. The doctrine of equitable conversion Is just that. It 
5 is equitable doctrine. If it is equitable to apply it, it is 
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6 notVapplied. If there are no strong equities, it is not 
7 applied. In this case there is no strong equity. 
8 THE COURT: The Court will take a ten-minute recess. 
9 The Court has read all the pleadings in support of and in 
10 opposition to the motion. We will take a ten-minute recess 
11 and return and make a ruling. 
12 (Court was in recess.) 
13 THE COURT: The record will reflect the court is 
14 back in session. Having read the memos in support of and in 
15 opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment — 
16 is that the only issue before the Court? 
17 MR. PIPELLA: Yes, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: The Court looks carefully at a number of 
19 facts and legal and equitable principles in this case, and 
20 observes as follows: Should the doctrine of equitable 
21 conversion apply? If so, what facts are persuasive in so 
22 ruling? The Court notes that when the Barkers gave a warranty 
23 deed to Dianne Hodge, after the Clements1 judgment against the 
24 Barkers had been docketed, that Dianne Hodge had construtive 
25 notice of the existence of the judgment lien, and so did the 
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plaintiffs. Prior to recording of the deeds from Barkers to 
Hodge, and from Hodge to Cannefax, Security Title Agency did a 
title search, and discovered the recorded judgment by 
Clements, As of that date, the Cannefaxes, through their 
agent, not only had constructive notice but they had actual 
notice that the judgment existed against the property. 
The Court suggests that a reasonable course of 
action would have been for the Cannefaxes to have insisted 
that the judgment lien be cleared at the time they purchased 
the property. Then Security Title could have either excepted 
that judgment lien from its coverage or made other 
arrangements to remove the cloud on title. Instead, they 
ignored the judgment, they bound the title insurance on the 
property, and they recorded the deeds. 
Now, the question is, if the Court is to be 
persuaded to rule under equitable doctrines, what is or what 
isn't equitable? Who was in the better position to anticipate 
the ultimate implications of that cloud on title, and to deal 
with it at the time of purchase of the property by the 
plaintiffs in this case? The Court feels and is persuaded by 
the Butler vs. Wilkinson case that states, in part, "A vendee 
who voluntarily assigns or sells his equitable interest to a 
third person does not by that assignment or sale extinguish a 
creditor's judgment lien that attached during the vendee's 
ownership of the equitable interest in the property, nor is a 
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judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by 
the vendor's sale of that interest to a third person." 
The Court rules that the contract vendor in fact 
does retain an interest in real property, and so rules that 
that was the case in the case before the Court. Based on the 
facts stipulated, argument of counsel, the law cited, it is 
the ruling of the Court that, according to the terms and 
conditions and amounts heretofore stipulated by the defendant, 
that summary judgment is granted to the defendant. 
Counsel, the Court appreciates a scholarly and 
exhaustive approach to the briefing of these issues. It is 
the type of case where, because of the complexity of the 
issues, because of the implications of the ruling, the Court 
appreciates the professional and thorough approach to this 
matter by both counsel. The defendant is ordered to prepare a 
written order consistent with the Court's ruling, submit it to 
the Court for signature and filing with the Clerk of the Court 
on or before the 5th day of March, 1988, 12 noon. Court is in 
recess. 
(This proceeding was concluded.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and DEBRA ' 
CANNEFAX, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L. ) 
CLEMENT, 
Defendants. ] 
ORDER AND SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C87-6232 
) Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, praying for 
judgment in their favor and against plaintiffs on the Complaint 
on file herein and for judgment in their favor and against 
plaintiffs on the Counterclaim on file herein, came on regularly 
for hearing on February 29, 1988 before The Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, District Judge. Plaintiffs appeared by their attorney, 
Rodney M. Pipella. Defendants appeared by their attorney, Steven 
H. Lybbert. The court has considered the Stipulated Facts, 
defendants1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and defendants1 Reply to Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, all of 
which are on file herein, and court has heard the oral arguments 
O00184 
of counsel. Having considered the above pleadings and oral 
argument, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor of defendants and 
against plaintiffs on the Complaint on file herein, and the 
Complaint is hereby dismissed; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. As a matter of law, a contract vendor of real 
property does retain an interest in the real property which is 
subject to the lien of a judgment against him, 
2. When defendants1 Judgment against George W. Barker, 
Jr. and Lila Mr. Barker was docketed with the Clerk of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on August 19, 1985, 
that Judgment created a valid lien against the property at 2563 
East Lockhart Road in Salt Lake County, Utah, which property is 
more particularly described in paragraph 5 of the Verified 
Complaint herein. 
3. In this case, in light of Stipulated Fact No. 14, 
it is equitable that the judgment lien created when said Judgment 
was docketed in Salt Lake County bound the property to the extent 
of the amount unpaid on the Uniform Real Estate Contract between 
the Barkers, as sellers, and Diane Hodge, as buyer, on September 
25, 1985, (the date Diane Hodge received a warranty deed from the 
Barkers and gave a warranty deed to plaintiffs), less the amount 
of the prior encumbrances on the property in favor of Prudential 
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Federal Savings & Loan Association and Continental Bank and Trust 
Company; to wit/ the judgment lien bound the Lockhart Road 
property in the sum of $54/464.94, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary injunction in 
effect in this case should be, and hereby is; dissolved. 
Dated this 1/ day of March/ 1988. 
BY THE COJIR-T: 
Approved as to form: 
The Hon. Pat B. 
District Judge 
H. D^'AON 
.^rifn 
Rfedn^y M. P ipe l la 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
-y MloAj^XJ^^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on July D / 1988, I 
hand delivered four copies of the foregoing Respondents1 Brief to 
Rodney M. Pipella, attorney for appellants, at 648 East First 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
/%UM l^MfttU-
Steven H. Lybbe£t 
